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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to consider this appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-3(2) (k) and 78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 1992). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Did the trial court correctly conclude that defendants Harvey 
and Jo Ann Rogers owed no duty to plaintiff? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 15-2-1 (1992). 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101 (1991). 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 32A-1-105(36) (1991). 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-209 (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a negligence action against defendant Billy 
Rogers and his parents Harvey and Jo Ann Rogers. Plaintiff and 
Billy Rogers participated in an unauthorized drinking party at the 
home of defendants Harvey and Jo Ann Rogers while Mr. and Mrs. 
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Rogers were out of town. Plaintiff and Billy Rogers eventually 
left the party in Billy's automobile and were involved in an 
accident. Plaintiff filed suit against both Billy Rogers and his 
parents. Plaintiff entered into a settlement with Billy, but 
continues to pursue his claim against Billy's parents. Plaintiff 
charged Mr. and Mrs. Rogers with liability under both the Utah 
Dramshop Act and under a common law negligence theory. Mr. and 
Mrs. Rogers moved for summary judgment, asserting that the Utah 
Dramshop Act does not apply to social hosts and also that Mr. and 
Mrs. Rogers owed no duty to plaintiff. At oral argument plaintiff 
abandoned his claim under the Utah Dramshop Act and proceeded 
solely on his negligence claim. (R. Ill). The trial court agreed 
that Mr. and Mrs. Rogers did not owe a duty to plaintiff and 
consequently awarded summary judgment to Mr. and Mrs. Rogers. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff began consuming alcohol at the age of 14. 
(Shane Strong Depo., p. 9) . Plaintiff drank to the point of 
drunkenness every weekend and also drank throughout the week. 
(Shane Strong Depo., p. 13). Plaintiff also began using drugs and 
smoked approximately five joints of marijuana a day. (Shane Strong 
Depo., p. 12). 
2. The following year plaintiff continued his drinking 
habits and increased his use of marijuana to 12 joints a day. 
Plaintiff also began using LSD and Cocaine nearly every other day. 
(Shane Strong Depo., p. 14). 
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3. Plaintiff financed his drug and alcohol habits by 
committing crimes. (Plaintiff's Depo., p. 15), At one point 
plaintiff hid from the police for five months before being arrested 
and confined to a lock-up facility. (Shane Strong Depo., pp. 7-9) . 
4. By the time of the accident plaintiff was drunk nearly 
every day. (Shane Strong Depo., p. 16). Plaintiff also continued 
his use of marijuana and LSD on a regular basis. (Shane Strong 
Depo., pp. 16-17). 
5. At the time of his deposition plaintiff was living in a 
group home for his drug and alcohol problems. Plaintiff was 
sentenced to the home when he came before a judge on criminal 
charges. (Shane Strong Depo., pp. 5-6). 
6. Billy Rogers is the son of defendants Harvey and Jo Ann 
Rogers. (Complaint f 7, R. 2). 
7. Billy Rogers was 19 years old at all times material to 
this action. (Depo. of Billy Rogers, p. 4). 
8. In April or May of 1989 Billy moved into his own 
apartment. (Jo Ann Rogers Depo., p. 5). On July 7, 1989 Billy 
went back to his parents' home to care for his parents' home and 
pets while his parents were away on vacation visiting other 
children. (Billy Rogers' Depo., p. 10,; Depo. Jo Ann Rogers, p. 
6) . While plaintiff claims that Billy had moved back into his 
parents' home, this fact is immaterial for purposes of defendant's 
motion for summary judgment. 
9. Before Mr. and Mrs. Rogers left they gave both plaintiff 
and Billy clear, unequivocal instructions that (1) no drinking was 
3 
to occur in the home; and (2) none of Billy's friends were to stay 
in the home. (Billy Rogers Depo., p. 10). 
10. Plaintiff was present when Mr. and Mrs. Rogers issued the 
above orders and agrees that the orders were given. (Shane Strong 
Depo., pp. 31, 35, 36, 39 and 52). 
11. Plaintiff knew that Mr. and Mrs. Rogers were serious when 
they ordered plaintiff and Billy not to drink in the house. (Shane 
Strong Depo., p. 52). 
12. Despite orders to the contrary, Plaintiff and Billy 
decided to have a drinking party in the Rogers' home on the evening 
of Friday, July 8, 1989. (Shane Strong Depo., p. 39). 
13. Plaintiff and Billy Rogers both knew that the drinking 
party they hosted was in direct violation of the orders given by 
Mr. and Mrs. Rogers. (Shane Strong Depo., p. 39). 
14. Plaintiff and Billy both knew that Mr. and Mrs. Rogers 
would not have allowed the party if they had been present. They 
would have stopped the party and ordered everyone out of the home. 
(Shane Strong Depo., pp. 39-40; Billy Rogers Depo., pp. 16-17). 
15. At approximately 9:00 p.m. Billy left plaintiff in the 
Rogers home and took his car to pick up some friends and to get 
some beer. (Billy Rogers Depo., pp. 11, 43). 
16. Billy picked up a few of his friends and then stopped at 
a Circle K on the way home to buy some beer (Billy Rogers Depo., 
pp. 34-35). 
17. One of Billy's friends, Tom, was old enough to legally 
purchase alcohol. Billy and another friend provided money to Tom, 
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who then went into Circle K and purchased a case of beer. (Billy 
Rogers Depo., pp. 35-36). 
18. When Billy returned to the Rogers home with his friends 
and the beer he found plaintiff and an uninvited friend of 
plaintiff, Eric Taylor, drinking alcohol belonging to Mr. and Mrs. 
Rogers. (Billy Rogers Depo., p. 11). Prior to that time Billy 
Rogers' friends had never consumed Mr. and Mrs. Rogers' liquor. 
(Billy Rogers Depo., p. 44). 
19. Billy claims to have been "very perturbed" upon 
discovering that plaintiff had stolen his parents' liquor. (Billy 
Rogers Depo., p. 11). 
20. There is a dispute as to whether Billy allowed plaintiff 
to drink Mr. and Mrs. Rogers' alcohol. (Billy Rogers Depo., p. 11; 
Shane Strong Depo., p. 28). However, the dispute is not material 
to this motion because both plaintiff and Billy acknowledge that 
they were not authorized to drink any alcohol in the Rogers' home, 
including the alcohol belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Rogers. (Billy 
Rogers Depo., p. 10; Shane Strong Depo., pp. 31, 35, 36, 39, 52). 
21. While in his parents' home Billy consumed approximately 
12 beers, or one-half of the case that was purchased by Billy and 
his friends. (Billy Rogers Depo., pp. 44-47, 57). 
22. As the evening wore on both plaintiff and Billy became 
intoxicated. (Billy Rogers Depo., pp. 46-47; Shane Strong Depo., 
p. 38). 
23. Later in the evening plaintiff and Billy left in Billy's 
car to take a friend for a ride. After the friend was dropped off 
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plaintiff occupied the front passenger seat of the vehicle. (Billy 
Rogers Depo., p. 13). 
24. While driving his vehicle Billy Rogers had an accident 
resulting in injuries to himself and to plaintiff. (Billy Rogers 
Depo., p. 14) . 
25. The car involved in the accident was owned and insured by 
Billy Rogers. (Jo Ann Rogers Depo., p. 30). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendants Harvey and Jo Ann Rogers cannot be liable for 
negligence because they owed no duty to plaintiff. The Utah 
Supreme Court has stated that, absent a special relationship, an 
individual has no duty to protect another from a third-party's 
negligence. Mr. and Mrs. Rogers had no special relationship with 
either plaintiff or Billy. Consequently defendants owed no duty to 
plaintiff and summary judgment can be granted as a matter of law. 
Plaintiff claims that a duty exists because Mr. and Mrs. 
Rogers allowed Billy to remain in their home with knowledge of 
Billy's drinking habits. This amounts to nothing more than an 
argument for social host liability. This court and the courts of 
nearly every other state have flatly rejected all notions of social 
host liability. The clear majority rule is that property owners 
are not liable for the torts of their intoxicated guests, even 
though the property owners allowed their guests to consume alcohol 
on the premises. Social hosts do not have a special relationship 
with their adult guests so as to give rise to a duty of protection 
to third parties. 
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The fact that Billy is the son of Mr. and Mrs. Rogers is also 
insufficient to create a special relationship and a duty of 
protection. At all times relevant hereto Billy Rogers was 19 years 
old. Virtually every case considering this issue has held that 
parents have no duty to prevent their adult children from becoming 
intoxicated, even when the adult child is under legal drinking age 
and even when the alcohol is consumed in the parents' home with 
their knowledge. 
Plaintiff similarly cannot impose liability upon Mr. and Mrs. 
Rogers by showing that they furnished Billy with alcohol. The 
undisputed facts of this case show that the alcohol Billy consumed 
was purchased by Billy and his friends. If any of Mr. and Mrs. 
Roger's liquor was consumed it was stolen rather than furnished by 
these defendants. In any event, it is clear that the furnishing of 
liquor by a social host is actionable only when authorized by a 
Dramshop Act. Utah's Dramshop Act has been specifically amended to 
preclude social host liability. Consequently a social host is not 
liable for furnishing alcohol to adults in Utah. 
Plaintiff has completely failed to establish any type of 
special relationship sufficient to impose a duty of protection upon 
Mr. and Mrs. Rogers. Consequently Mr. and Mrs. Rogers owed no duty 
to plaintiff. The trial court correctly reached this conclusion 
and granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I - IN THE ABSENCE OF A SPECIAL 
RELATIONSHIP, MR. AND MRS. ROGERS OWED NO DUTY 
TO PLAINTIFF. 
"Establishing [that] the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty 
of care is an essential element of a negligence claim". Lamarr v. 
Utah State Dept. of Trans., 828 P.2d 535, 537 (Utah App. 1992). 
"Without a showing of duty, a plaintiff cannot recover." Id. at 
537-38. "Whether the defendant owed a plaintiff a duty of care is 
entirely a question of law to be determined by the court." Id. at 
538. 
In this case plaintiff was injured by the negligent driving of 
Billy Rogers. Defendants Harvey and Jo Ann Rogers were not 
involved with the driving of Billy's vehicle. However, plaintiff 
claimr that Mr. and Mrs. Rogers should have protected plaintiff 
from Billy's negligence by prohibiting Billy from accessing the 
Rogers' home because Billy was a known abuser of alcohol. 
Plaintiff asserts that Mr. and Mrs. Rogers breached their duty of 
protection by allowing their adult son to remain in their home 
unattended. Plaintiff's arguments fail as a matter of law. 
As provided in § 315 of the Second Restatement of Torts, Mr. 
and Mrs. Rogers did not have a duty to protect plaintiff from Billy 
Rogers' negligent conduct. Such a duty can only exist where Mr. 
and Mrs. Rogers have a special relationship with plaintiff or 
Billy: 
There is no duty so to control the conduct of 
a third person as to prevent him from causing 
physical harm to another unless 
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(a) a special relationship exists between 
the actor and the third person which imposes a 
duty upon the actor to control the third 
person's conduct, or 
(b) a special relationship exists between 
the actor and the other which gives to the 
other a right to protection. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (1965)• 
As this court has acknowledged, "the Utah Supreme Court has 
adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315. . . . " Sneddon 
v. Graham. 821 P.2d 1185, 1190 n.2 (Utah App. 1991). One example 
is found in Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986). 
The plaintiff in Beach was a 2 0 year old student at the 
University of Utah. The plaintiff enrolled in a biology class 
taught by Cuellar that required weekend field trips. During one 
field trip Cuellar and his students began drinking alcohol. While 
intoxicated the plaintiff became disorientated and wandered over a 
cliff. The plaintiff sued Cuellar and the University of Utah for 
negligence. The defendants moved for and received summary judgment 
on the grounds that the defendants owed no duty to the plaintiff. 
On appeal the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the award of summary 
judgment to the defendants. The Supreme Court explained that, 
absent a special relationship, an individual has no duty to protect 
another from the effects of intoxication: 
Ordinarily, a party does not have an affirma-
tive duty to care for another. Absent unusual 
circumstances which justify imposing such an 
affirmative responsibility, one has no duty to 
look after the safety of another who has 
become voluntarily intoxicated and thus 
limited his ability to protect himself. The 
law imposes upon one party an affirmative duty 
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to act only when certain special relationships 
exist between the parties. These relation-
ships generally arise when one assumes 
responsibility for another's safety or 
deprives another of his or her normal oppor-
tunities for self-protection. The essence of 
a special relationship is dependence by one 
party upon the other or mutual dependence 
between the parties. 
Id, at 415-16 (emphasis added, citations and quotations omitted). 
The supreme court next concluded that no special relationship 
existed between the plaintiff and the defendants, even though the 
defendants knew of the plaintiff's propensity to abuse alcohol: 
The primary thrust of Beach's claim before 
this court . . . is that . . . Cuellar knew or 
should have known of her propensity to become 
disoriented after drinking. Because of this 
knowledge, Beach maintains that the University 
had a special duty to supervise her on the 
evening in question. We do not agree that any 
special duty arose by reason of Cuellar's 
knowledge. 
Id. at 416 (emphasis added). 
The court additionally found that a special relationship did 
not arise from the fact that the defendants allowed the plaintiff 
to consume alcohol, even though she was under age. The court 
pointed out that the plaintiff was legally an adult, even though 
she was too young to legally consume alcohol: 
The students whose relationship to the 
University we are asked to characterize as 
"custodial" are not juveniles. Beach was 2 0 
years of age at the time of the accident. She 
may have been denied the right to drink by 
Utah law, but in virtually all other respects 
she was entitled to be treated as an adult. 
10 
It would be unrealistic to impose upon an 
institution of higher education the additional 
role of custodian over its adult students and 
to charge it with responsibility for pre-
venting students from illegally consuming 
alcohol and, should they do so, with respon-
sibility for assuring their safety and the 
safety of others. 
* * * 
A realistic assessment of the nature of the 
relationship between the parties here 
precludes our finding that a special relation-
ship existed between the University and Beach 
or other adult students. 
Id. at 418-19. 
The instant case is identical to Beach in every material 
respect and is thus controlled by that opinion. As in Beach, 
plaintiff is suing Mr. and Mrs. Rogers for failing to protect him 
from the effects of Billy's voluntary intoxication. As in Beach, 
plaintiff claims that defendants are under a duty of care because 
of their knowledge that Billy had a propensity to abuse alcohol. 
As in Beach, the parties consuming the alcohol were adults, even 
though they were under age for purposes of alcohol consumption. 
Each of plaintiff's arguments have already been considered and 
rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. Consequently, the award of 
summary judgment to these defendants must be affirmed. 
POINT II — NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP EXISTS SO 
AS TO GIVE RISE TO A DUTY OF CARE. 
As demonstrated, a duty of protection will only be imposed 
upon Mr. and Mrs. Rogers after plaintiff shows the existence of a 
special relationship. Plaintiff cannot show such a relationship. 
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A. No Special Relationship Arises From the Fact That Defendants 
Allowed Billy to Remain in Their Home Unattended. 
Plaintiff argues that a duty of protection must be imposed 
upon Mr. and Mrs. Rogers because they allowed Billy to remain in 
their home unattended even though he had a history of alcohol 
abuse. This fact, even if true, does not create a special 
relationship so as to put Mr. and Mrs. Rogers under a duty of care, 
as recognized by this court in Sneddon v. Graham. 821 P. 2d 1185 
(Utah App. 1991). 
The facts in Sneddon are similar to the facts of the instant 
case. In Sneddon an individual by the name of Wenkel was a guest 
in the home of defendant Graham. While visiting in the Graham home 
Wenkel consumed eight cans of beer, some of which was provided by 
Graham. It was alleged that Graham allowed Wenkel to consume the 
alcohol even after Graham knew Wenkel was intoxicated. Graham then 
permitted Wenkel to drive home. On the way home Wenkel's vehicle 
collided with a vehicle operated by Sneddon. Sneddon filed suit 
against both Wenkel and Graham for personal injuries under Utah's 
Dramshop Act. Graham requested and was granted summary judgment on 
the basis that Utah's Dramshop Act does not apply to social hosts. 
Sneddon then filed a motion to amend her complaint to add a claim 
for common law negligence (i.e. common-law social host liability). 
This motion was denied by the trial court, which held that: 
The court is of the opinion that there is not 
a common law cause of action running in favor 
of a person injured against a person who 
supplied alcohol, nor does the court believe 
that the provisions of Utah's Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Act affords a plaintiff a 
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cause of action under the facts and 
circumstances of this case. . . . 
Id. at 1189 (quoting trial court). 
On appeal the plaintiff argued that Graham, as a social host, 
was liable under both the Utah Dramshop Act and the common law. 
Both of these arguments were rejected by this court. The court 
first pointed out that the Dramshop Act applies only to commercial 
suppliers of alcohol — not to social hosts: 
We decline to accept Sneddon's arguments, and 
affirm the trial court's legal conclusion that 
the Dramshop Act does not apply to individuals 
in a non-commercial social setting. 
Id. at 1188. 
The court next addressed the merits of plaintiff's claim for 
social host liability under the common law. The court pointed out 
that the Utah courts have never recognized a claim for common-law 
social host liability. The court further explained that, even if 
such a claim was recognized, the plaintiff could not prevail under 
such a theory because no special relationship existed between 
Sneddon and Graham: 
Sneddon also urges us to recognize a common 
law action of negligence in the context of a 
social host, an issue which had not been 
addressed in the courts of this state to date. 
However, we note the Utah Supreme Court has 
adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 
315, which states that no duty can be found to 
protect another from harm unless and until a 
special relationship exists between the 
parties. No such relationship has been 
established between Sneddon and Graham. 
Id. at 1190 n.2 (citing Beach v. University of Utah. 726 P.2d 413 
(Utah 1986)). 
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In the instant case plaintiff has simply asserted the same two 
claims that were asserted in Sneddon: 1) that social hosts are 
liable under the Utah Dramshop Act; and 2) that social hosts are 
liable under a common law negligence theory. Plaintiff has 
voluntarily withdrawn his first claim but continues to pursue the 
second. Sneddon directly controls both of the claims asserted in 
plaintiff's complaint and consequently plaintiff's complaint must 
be dismissed as a matter of law. Plaintiff has even less grounds 
for imposing social host liability than did Sneddon, due to the 
fact that defendants were not physically present when the alcohol 
was consumed and did not actively furnish alcohol and encourage its 
consumption as did the social host in Sneddon. 
Utah is by no means the only state to reject the notion of 
common-law social host liability. As pointed out by the Arizona 
Court of Appeals, "Except for the State of New Jersey, all the 
state courts that have considered the question of extending the 
liability of the non-licensee, or social host, [have] declined to 
do so. . . . " Bruce v. Chas Roberts Air Conditioning, Inc.. 801 
P.2d 456, 459 (Ariz. App. 1990). One example of the majority rule 
is found in Walker v. Kennedy, 337 N.W.2d 254 (Minn. 1983). 
In Walker the defendants, husband and wife, left their home 
and children in the care of their 21-year old daughter Marianne. 
The defendants expressly prohibited their children from hosting any 
parties during the parents' absence. Notwithstanding this fact 
Marianne allowed her 16-year old sister to host a party for other 
minors. At the party alcohol was consumed and an individual named 
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Welin became intoxicated. Welin left the party in his automobile 
and later became involved in an accident with a snowmobile in which 
the driver of the snowmobile was killed. The deceased's estate 
filed suit against the parent homeowners, claiming social host 
liability. The parents moved for summary judgment but their motion 
was denied. 
On appeal the decision of the trial court was reversed and 
summary judgment was awarded to the parents. The court cited § 315 
of the Second Restatement of Torts and held that the parents did 
not owe a duty to the deceased. The court explained that "it was 
the conduct of a party with whom defendant did not have a special 
relationship that caused the injury." Id. at 255. 
The court went on to explain that even Marianne, the 21-year 
old daughter in charge of the home, did not have a special 
relationship with the plaintiff, in spite of the fact that she was 
aware of her sister's propensity to host drinking parties: 
We will briefly note two considerations that 
concern the issue of Marianne's negligence. 
First, there is no special relationship 
between Marianne and Welin that would impose a 
duty upon Marianne to control Welin's conduct. 
Second, . . . a propensity to provide a 
location for parties, at which alcohol may be 
consumed by minors, does not constitute a 
dangerous propensity as contemplated by . . . 
the Restatement. 
Id. at 255 n.2. 
Another example can be found in the case of Reinert v. 
Dolezel, 383 N.W.2d 148 (Mich. App. 1985). In Reinert David 
Dolezel and four of his friends held a drinking party at the home 
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of David's parents, Mr. and Mrs. Dolezel. David and all but one of 
his friends were 18 years old. Mr. and Mrs. Dolezel were home 
during the party but did not actively participate. After midnight 
David and his friends left in Mr. Dolezel's car. The plaintiffs 
occupied the front and back seats of the vehicle. While driving 
David failed to negotiate a curve and crashed, killing one 
passenger and injuring another. Two separate lawsuits were 
initiated on behalf of the injured parties against Mr. and Mrs. 
Dolezel. The complaints alleged that "defendants knowingly 
permitted the use and consumption by under-aged individuals of 
intoxicating beverages on or about their premises . . . causing 
unsafe conditions without proper supervision." Id. at 149-150. 
However, both suits were dismissed at the trial level on the 
grounds that Mr. and Mrs. Dolezel "had no common-law duty to 
prevent their 18-year old son from drinking alcoholic beverages in 
their home or to provide safe transportation for his similarly-aged 
friends." Id. at 149. 
On appeal the award of summary judgment to the parents was 
affirmed. The court stated that "averments that defendants 
negligently supervised the dispensation and consumption of alcohol 
by persons under 21 years of age do not state a cause of action 
upon which relief can be granted." Xd. at 150. The court further 
explained that parents do not have a duty to supervise illegal 
activity conducted in their home by their adult children and other 
adults: 
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A person who is 18 years of age is deemed to 
be an adult of legal age for all purposes 
whatsoever and shall have the same duties, 
liabilities, responsibilities, rights and 
legal capacity as persons heretofore acquired 
at 21 years of age, notwithstanding any other 
provision of law to the contrary. These 
people were not minors; they were adults who 
were not old enough to drink alcoholic 
beverages legally. Any duty the parents had 
to supervise their child7s conduct ended when 
that child became an adult. To make home-
owners civilly liable for illegal activity 
being conducted by adults in their home, of 
which the homeowners have no part, would be to 
break new ground in . . . jurisprudence. The 
problem of teenagers who drink and drive is a 
serious one. But we know of no jurisdiction 
which imposes a duty upon homeowners to stop 
adults from illegally drinking in their home. 
Id. at 151 (emphasis added). 
In the instant case plaintiff has even less grounds for 
asserting liability against Mr. and Mrs. Rogers than the plaintiff 
did in Reinert, where the parents were present during the drinking 
party and allowed their son to use their own automobile. Such 
aggravating circumstances are not present in this case. 
Numerous other decisions have similarly refused to impose 
liability in factually similar circumstances. See e.g. Bruce v. 
Chas Roberts Air Conditioning, Inc., 801 P.2d 456 (Ariz. App. 1990) 
(a defendant who allows another to become intoxicated on his 
premises owes no duty to a person injured by the intoxicated 
individual); Johnston v. KFC Nat7!. Management Co., 788 P.2d 159, 
162 (Haw. 1990) ("The clear trend has been a refusal to impose a 
duty upon a social host to protect third parties from risk of 
injuries that may be caused by an adult who is provided and served 
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alcohol beverages."); Bowling v. Popp, 536 N.E.2d 511 (Ind. App. 
1989) (a plaintiff who is injured in an automobile accident with a 
drunken driver has no cause of action against the persons who owned 
the home where the alcohol was consumed, even though the drinking 
party was hosted by the homeowner's 18 and 19 year old children; 
quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315); Alioto v. Marnell, 
520 N.E.2d 1284 (Mass. 1988) (parents who knowingly allowed their 
19 year old son to host a drinking party in their home are not 
liable to persons injured or killed in a subsequent automobile 
accident with the intoxicated son, even though the parents had 
knowledge of their son's repeated history of alcohol abuse); 
Bambino v. Dunn, 420 N.W.2d 866 (Mich. App. 1988) (persons owning 
the home where a drinking party was held are not liable to persons 
injured in an automobile accident caused by a 19 year old guest who 
had consumed alcohol at the party.); Christensen v. Parrish, 266 
N.W.2d 826 (Mich. App. 1978) (a homeowner is not liable for 
injuries sustained by a passenger in a vehicle driven by a drunken 
minor, even though the minor became intoxicated at a drinking party 
in the defendant's home with 4he defendant's knowledge); Wiener v. 
Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 485 P.2d 18 (Ore. 
1971) (property owners who knowingly allowed fraternity to host 
underage drinking party on the premises are not liable for injuries 
sustained by a passenger in a vehicle driven by a minor who became 
intoxicated at the party and subsequently collided his vehicle into 
a building). 
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As demonstrated by the overwhelming weight of authority, Mr. 
and Mrs. Rogers are not liable to plaintiff for injuries inflicted 
by their adult son, even though the injuries stem from their son's 
consumption of alcohol in their home. Plaintiff has failed to cite 
any authority to the contrary. The five cases cited on pages 10 
and 11 of plaintiff's brief are all easily distinguishable. 
The first case cited by plaintiff is Garriup Constr. Co. v. 
Foster, 519 N.E.2d 1224 (Ind. 1988). Garriup actually supports the 
arguments advanced by defendant: "Most courts continue to refuse 
to hold social hosts accountable for serving liquor to adults." 
Id. at 1227. "This court is unwilling to depart from the general 
rule followed in most jurisdictions, and we hold that common law 
liquor liability shall not be extended to the purely social host, 
except in cases involving a breach of statutory duty." Id. at 
1228. The reason the court in Garriup found liability was because 
Indiana's Dramshop Act applied to non commercial parties (Id. at 
1227) and because a special employer/employee relationship existed 
between the plaintiff and the tort feasor. Id. at 1229. The court 
also found it significant that the employer had actually hosted the 
party and furnished the alcohol. Id. at 1226. None of these 
circumstances are present in the instant case. The court should 
note that Garriup was harshly criticized in Bruce v. Chas. Roberts 
Air Conditioning, Inc., 801 P.2d 456, 463 (Ariz. App. 1990). 
Plaintiff next cites to Acklev v. Chicago & N.W. 
Transportation Co. , 820 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1987). Ackley has 
absolutely no application to this case. In Ackley an employee sued 
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his employer for failing to provide a ladder with rubberized safety 
shoes. There were no injured third-parties and there was no 
drinking. Indeed, the sole issue presented to the court did not 
even involve the common law, but rather involved a legal issue 
under the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA): "We therefore 
examine solely Ackley's claim that the trial court erroneously 
instructed the jury regarding the railroad's duties under FELA." 
Id. at 2 66. 
Plaintiff next cites to Dortman v. Lesterf 155 N.W.2d 1846 
(Mich. 1968) an old case with a four-three split. Dortman imposed 
liability upon a father who allowed his son, an incompetent driver, 
to drive a motor vehicle. Dortman says nothing about whether a 
parent can be liable for allowing a child to use the parent's home 
to host a drinking party. 
Finally, plaintiff cites to Maclearv v. Hines, 817 F.2d 1081 
(3rd Cir. 1987) and Morella v. Machu, 563 A.2d 881 (N.J. Super. 
1989). Plaintiff correctly acknowledges that both of these cases 
are distinguishable. (Plaintiff's Brief, p. 11). Unlike the 
instant case, both Macleary and Morella involved the consumption of 
alcohol by minors. Morella acknowledges that the law differs with 
respect to alcohol consumption by minors and adults. See Morella, 
563 A. 2d at 883. Morella also comes from New Jersey, which has 
been recognized as the only state extending liability to a social 
host. See Bruce v. Chas Roberts Air Conditioning, Inc., 801 P.2d 
456, 459 (Ariz. App. 1990). With regard to Macleary the court 
should note that the opinion did not consider the liability of the 
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homeowners, but rather imposed liability upon the 19-year old 
daughter who hosted the party. Macleary thus stands for the 
proposition that Billy Rogers is liable — not his parents. 
As demonstrated, no special relationship is created when a 
homeowner allows adults to have a drinking party on his premises. 
Consequently the homeowner is under no duty to protect third 
persons from being injured by intoxicated guests. The trial 
court's award of summary judgment to defendants must therefore be 
upheld. 
B. No Special Relationship Arises From the Fact that Billy Rogers 
is the Son of Mr. and Mrs. Rogers. 
The fact that Billy Rogers is the 19-year old son of defen-
dants Harvey and Jo Ann Rogers does not give rise to a special 
relationship sufficient to impose a duty of protection upon Mr. and 
Mrs. Rogers. At all times pertinent hereto Billy was an adult. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 15-2-1 (1992) . Once Billy obtained adulthood 
any special relationship existing between him and his parents 
ceased to exist, as demonstrated in Alioto v. Marnell, 520 N.E.2d 
1284 (Mass. 1988). 
In Alioto an individual named Michael Marnell hosted a 
drinking party in the home of his parents. Michael was 19 years of 
age at the time but continued to live in his parents home. The 
drinking party was held with the knowledge and approval of 
Michael's parents. The parents were aware that alcoholic beverages 
would be consumed at the party. Furthermore, the parents knew that 
their son Michael had a propensity to drink and drive and that he 
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had been involved in numerous prior incidents, one of which led to 
the loss of his driver's license. Mr. and Mrs. Marnell nonetheless 
consented to the party. Michael became intoxicated at the party 
and eventually drove off in his father's automobile. While driving 
Michael collided with another automobile and killed the driver. 
The driver's estate filed suit against Mr. and Mrs. Marnell for 
negligence in allowing their son to host a drinking party. The 
suit was dismissed on the parents' summary judgment motion and the 
plaintiff appealed. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld the award of summary 
judgment to Mr. and Mrs. Marnell, finding that no special 
relationship existed between the Marnells and their son so as to 
put Mr. and Mrs. Marnell under a duty of protection: 
The gravamen of the plaintiff's action is the 
defendants' allegedly negligent failure to 
supervise and control their son Michael's 
actions. A parent has a duty to exercise 
reasonable care to prevent his minor child 
from intentionally or negligently inflicting 
harm on others, where the parent knows or 
should know of the child's propensity for a 
particular type of harmful conduct and has the 
opportunity to take reasonable corrective 
measures. Caldwell v. Zaher, 344 Mass. 590, 
592, 183 N.E.2d 706 (1962). The plaintiff 
asks us to extend the rationale of Caldwell to 
this case. We decline to do so. 
In Caldwell, the plaintiff stated a good cause 
of action for alleging that the defendants 
knew or should have known of their minor 
child's propensity to assault other children, 
but did nothing to restrain such propensity. 
Id. at 591-592, 183 N.E.2d 706. Here, there 
were assertions that the defendants knew or 
should have known of their son's propensity to 
drink and drive, because he previously had 
been involved in incidents involving drinking, 
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and had lost his driver's license for 
operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol. Unlike the child in 
Caldwell, however, at the time of this 
incident. Michael Marnell, although below the 
legal drinking age, was not a minor, but an 
adult. He had graduated from high school some 
17 months earlier, had been working full-time 
for at least 14 months, and was in all 
relevant aspects emancipated from his parents. 
The fortuity of his living in his home does 
not create a duty where none otherwise exists; 
nor does their status as parents, without 
more, impose on the defendants the duty to 
supervise and control their emancipated adult 
son. 
Id. at 1285-86 (some emphasis added, some citations omitted). 
The court explained that its holding was unaffected by the 
fact that Michael Marnell was under legal drinking age: 
The legal drinking age has little importance. 
What is important is that Michael was an adult 
for all purposes (except as to the legal 
drinking age), that the defendants did not 
serve or make alcoholic beverages available to 
him, and that they violated no statute. The 
imposition of liability for failure to super-
vise a competent adult child is unwarranted on 
the facts of this case. 
Id. at 1286 n.3. 
A similar result was reached in Reinert v. Dolezel, 383 N.W.2d 
148 (Mich. App. 1985), where the court stated: 
Although plaintiff refers to the young people 
involved in this case as 'minors' they were 
not. At the time of this incident, decedent 
Reinert was 19 years old, plaintiff Casco was 
18 years old, as was defendant David Dolezel, 
Jr. A person who is 18 years of age is deemed 
to be an adult of legal age for all purposes 
whatsoever and shall have the same duties, 
liabilities, responsibilities, rights and 
legal capacity as persons heretofore acquired 
at 21 years of age, notwithstanding any other 
provision of law to the contrary. These 
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people were not minors; they were adults who 
were not old enough to drink alcoholic 
beverages legally. Any duty the parents had 
to supervise their child's conduct ended when 
that child became an adult. To make home-
owners civilly liable for illegal activity 
being conducted by adults in their home, of 
which the homeowners have no part, would be to 
break new ground in Michigan jurisprudence. 
The problem of teenagers who drink and drive 
is a serious one. But we know of no juris-
diction which imposes a duty upon homeowners 
to stop adults from illegally drinking in 
their home. 
* * * 
There is no duty to control the conduct of a 
third party so as to prevent him from causing 
physical harm to another unless a special 
relationship exists. . . . Parents are under 
a duty to exercise reasonable care to control 
their minor child, but this duty ends when the 
child becomes an adult, and that happens in 
Michigan at age 18. 
Id. at 151 (emphasis added), citing Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 315. 
The facts of the instant case are no different than the 
material facts contained in the preceding authorities. The award 
of summary judgment to Mr. and Mrs. Rogers should therefore be 
affirmed. 
POINT III — MR. AND MRS. ROGERS CANNOT BE 
HELD LIABLE FOR FURNISHING ALCOHOL. 
Plaintiff argues that Mr. and Mrs. Rogers were under a duty of 
care because they "went out of town and left [Billy] in charge of 
a house stocked with alcohol." Plaintiff's Brief, page 13. 
Plaintiff insinuates that Mr. and Mrs. Rogers furnished Billy with 
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alcohol and should therefore be held liable. This is simply 
untrue. 
The undisputed facts of this case show that Mr. and Mrs. 
Rogers prohibited both plaintiff and Billy from consuming any type 
of alcohol on their premises. This included the alcohol of Mr. and 
Mrs. Rogers. Plaintiff acknowledges that Mr. and Mrs. Rogers were 
serious when they gave these instructions and that Mr. and Mrs. 
Rogers would have kicked plaintiff out of their home if they had 
been present when plaintiff consumed their alcohol. Plaintiff 
cannot seriously allege that Mr. and Mrs. Rogers furnished alcohol 
to plaintiff and Billy. Any of Mr. and Mrs. Rogers7 liquor that 
was consumed was stolen, and not "furnished" by defendants. 
Plaintiff would make defendants negligent for simply keeping 
liquor in their home. Such a fact does not constitute negligence, 
as illustrated in Bowling v. Popp, 536 N.E.2d 511 (Ind. App. 1989). 
In Bowling two children, ages 18 and 19, held a beer party in 
the home of their parents. The parents maintained a private stock 
of liquor in their home. Although the parents were aware of the 
party, they did not know that alcohol was being consumed. A guest 
eventually left the party in an intoxicated condition and, while 
driving, struck the plaintiff's vehicle. The plaintiff filed suit 
against the parents for negligence alleging that "the mere presence 
of the beer and the fact that [the children] hosted a party 
[established] . . . that the [parents] furnished intoxicants to 
[the guest]." Id. at 514. However, the court rejected the 
plaintiff's arguments and found the parents not liable. The court 
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held that "even if the underage participants engaged in a common 
scheme and drank from a common bottle [belonging to the parents], 
it would not constitute furnishing." Id. 
The undisputed facts show that Mr. and Mrs. Rogers did not 
furnish Billy with alcohol. However, even if plaintiff could 
somehow show that the Rogers' did furnish Billy with alcohol, the 
law would not provide plaintiff with a remedy against Mr. and Mrs. 
Rogers. At common law a person who furnishes alcohol to an 
intoxicated individual is not liable to third persons injured by 
the intoxicated individual. See Johnston v. KFC Nat'l. Management 
Co. , 788 P.2d 159, 161 (Haw. 1990) ("Traditionally, the common law 
held that when a person consumes alcohol to a point of being 
intoxicated and injures another, he is the sole proximate cause of 
that injury. Thus, no liability could be attributed to the 
supplier of the alcoholic beverages."); Bruce v. Chas Roberts Air 
Conditioning, Inc. , 801 P.2d 456, 460 (Ariz. App. 1990) ("The 
tavern owner, social host, and employer were not liable at common 
law. . . . " ) . A person can only be liable for furnishing alcohol 
if a statute (i.e. a Dramshop Act) prohibits him from doing so. 
The Utah Supreme Court seems to have recognized this principle: 
Dictum in Yost suggests, however, that Utah 
recognizes no common law right of action 
against a provider of alcohol based upon the 
fact that the alcohol was furnished in 
violation of the law. If this dictum is 
accurate, any liability premised directly on 
the illegal furnishing of alcohol would have 
to arise from a statutory provision. 
Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 417 n.3 (Utah 1986). 
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Although the Utah Dramshop Act originally applied to 
homeowners, this court has recognized that the Act was subsequently 
amended to limit its application to commercial suppliers of alcohol 
only. See Sneddon v. Graham, 821 P.2d 1185, 1188 n.l (Utah App. 
1991) . See also Utah Code Ann. § 32a-14-191 (1991) ; Utah Code Ann. 
§ 32A-1-105(36) (1991). Plaintiff has acknowledged that he now has 
no remedy under the Dramshop Act. (R. Ill). The amendment 
reflects direct legislative intent to deny social host liability in 
Utah. If social host liability is to be reinstated, it should be 
reinstated by the legislature and not by the courts: 
The nature of the judicial role prevents us 
from capably deciding the merits of social 
host liability. Evaluating the overall merits 
of social host liability, with its wide 
sweeping implications, requires a balancing of 
the costs and benefits for society as a whole, 
not just the parties of any one case. 
Social host liability implicates changes in 
social relations in a society where 
consumption of alcohol is a pervasive and 
deeply rooted part of our social life. 
From an economic perspective, there needs to 
be consideration of the effect social host 
liability would have on homeowners and 
renter's insurance rates, and the economic 
impact on those not wealthy or foresighted 
enough to obtain such insurance. Furthermore, 
cost considerations are not limited to an 
ultimate finding of liability against the 
social host. A host will, in all probability, 
be made a defendant in a civil suit for 
damages and compensation brought by a third 
person who is injured in a car accident 
involving a* friend, invitee or guest of the 
host who provided and served the alcoholic 
beverage, thereby incurring the cost of 
defending against such a suit even though the 
host may not be liable. 
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Johnston v. KFC Nat7!. Management Co., 788 P.2d 159, 163-64 (Haw. 
1990) (citations and quotations omitted). See also Bruce v. Chas 
Roberts Air Conditioning, Inc., 801 P.2d 456, 460 (Ariz. App. 1990) 
("Any policy modifications which are designed to encompass the 
potential liability of social providers of intoxicating beverages 
should be left to the sound discretion of the legislature."). 
In light of the foregoing authorities, and in light of the 
undisputed facts, it is evident that defendants cannot be found 
liable for furnishing alcohol to plaintiff or Billy. Defendants' 
motion for summary judgment should therefore be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff claims that defendants were negligent in allowing 
their son Billy, a known abuser of alcohol, to remain in their home 
unattended, thereby leading to his intoxication and the subsequent 
injury of plaintiff. Plaintiff's claim fails as a matter of law. 
Absent a special relationship, Mr. and Mrs. Rogers owed no duty to 
plaintiff. The foregoing authorities conclusively demonstrate that 
Mr. and Mrs. Rogers had no special relationship with either 
plaintiff or Billy. 
The facts of this case are also insufficient to support a 
finding that Mr. and Mrs. Rogers furnished alcohol to their son 
Billy. In any event, even if they had furnished alcohol, plaintiff 
could not recover from Mr. and Mrs. Rogers because their claim is 
not allowed under the Utah Dramshop Act. 
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Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a cause of action against 
these defendants. Defendants therefore urge this court to affirm 
the trial court's award of summary judgment. 
DATED this /(/? day of /^&^Ut&fr^7 / 1993. 
"Paul M. B e l n a p / 
David R. Nielson 
Attorneys for Appellees 
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Addendum 
15-2-1. Period of minority. 
The period of minority extends in males and females to the age of eighteen 
years; but all minors obtain their majority by marriage. It is further provided 
that courts in divorce actions may order support to age 21. 
324-14-101. Liability for injuries resulting from distribu-
tion of alcoholic beverages — Causes of action — 
Statute of limitations — Employee protections. 
(1) Any person who directly gives, sells, or otherwise provides liquor, or at a 
location allowing consumption on the premises, any alcoholic beverage, to the 
following persons, and by those actions causes the intoxication of that person, 
is liable for injuries in person, property, or means of support to any third 
person, or to the spouse, child, or parent of that third person, resulting from 
the intoxication: 
(a) any person under the age of 21 years; 
(b) any person who is apparently under the influence of intoxicating 
alcoholic beverages or products or drugs; 
(c) any person whom the person furnishing the alcoholic beverage 
knew or should have known from the circumstances was under the influ-
ence of intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or drugs; or 
(d) any person who is a known interdicted person. 
(2) An employer is liable for the actions of its employees in violation of this 
chapter. 
(3) A person who suffers an injury under Subsection (1) has a cause of 
action against the person who provided the alcoholic beverage in violation of 
Subsection (1). 
(4) If a person having rights or liabilities under this chapter dies, the rights 
or liabilities provided by this chapter survive to or against that person's es-
tate. 
(5) The total amount of damages that may be awarded to any person pursu-
ant to a cause of action under this chapter that arises after July 1, 1985 is 
limited to $100,000 and the aggregate amount which may be awarded to all 
persons injured as a result of one occurrence is limited to $300,000. 
(6) An action based upon a cause of action under this chapter shall be 
commenced within two years after the date of the injury. 
(7) Nothing in this chapter precludes any cause of action or additional 
recovery against the person causing the injury. 
(8) (a) A sanction or termination of employment may not be imposed upon 
any employee of any restaurant, airport lounge, private club, on-premise 
beer retailer, or any other establishment serving alcoholic beverages as a 
result of the employee having exercised the employee's independent judg-
ment to refuse to sell alcoholic beverages to any person the employee 
considers to meet one or more of the conditions described in Subsection 
(1). 
(b) Any employer who terminates an employee or imposes sanctions on 
the employee contrary to this section is considered to have discriminated 
against that employee and is subject to the conditions and penalties set 
forth in Chapter 35, Title 34, the Utah Antidiscriminatory Act. 
32A-1-105. rfinitions. 
(36) "Premises means any building, enclosure, room, or equipment 
used in connection with the sale, storage, service, manufacture, distribu-
tion, or consumption of alcoholic products, unless otherwise defined in 
this title or in the rules adopted by the commission. 
32A-12-209. Unlawful purchase, possession, or consump-
tion by minors. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person under the age of 21 years to purchase, 
possess, or consume any alcoholic beverage or product, unless specifically 
authorized by this title. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person under the age of 21 years to misrepresent 
his age, or for any other person to misrepresent the age of a minor, for the 
purpose of purchasing or otherwise obtaining an alcoholic beverage or product 
for a minor. 
(3) It is unlawful for any person under the age of 21 years to possess or 
consume any alcoholic beverage while riding in a limousine or chartered bus. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHRISTINE DRYSDALE on behalf 
of her minor son, SHANE STRONG, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
BILLY J. ROGERS, HARVEY ROGERS 
AND JO ANN ROGERS and JOHN 
DOES 1-5, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 900900166PI 
Judge Ronald O. Hyde 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
before the Honorable Ronald O. Hyde, District Court Judge, at his 
courtroom, Ogden, Utah, on the 7th day of May, 1992, at the hour 
of 10:30 A.M., with the plaintiff being represented by his 
counsel of record and the defendants Harvey and JoAnn Rogers 
being represented by their counsel of record. 
The matter was heard on defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The court reviewed the memoranda in support and in 
opposition and heard the argument of counsel and issued its 
Ruling on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment dated May 14, 
1992, and for good cause appearing, it is 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and the complaint of 
plaintiff against defendants Harvey and JoAnn Rogers is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice, costs to defendants. 
DATED this day of June, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
IM 
Ronald O. Hyde 
District Court Judge 
-2-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this f<&\ day of June, 1992, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed, first 
class postage prepaid, to: 
James R. Hasenyager 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
2661 Washington Boulevard, Suite 202 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Bernard L. Allen 
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN 
Co-counsel for Defendants 
Harvey and JoAnn Rogers 
2568 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHRISTINE DRYSDALE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BILLY J. ROGERS, et ux., 
Defendant. 
\ 
\ 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 900900166 
MAY 1 4 1992 
Plaintiff's cause of action against the parents of Billy 
J. Rogers is based on common law liability. 
The uncontested facts show that the subject accident 
occurred at roughly 3:30 a.m. on the morning of Saturday, July 
9, 1989, At that time Billy Rogers was nineteen. 
Billy Rogers, the adult son of defendant's Harvey and 
Joanne Rogers moved out of his parents home some months prior to 
the accident that is subject to this case. Having moved out in 
May 1989, on July 6, 1989, Billy Rogers moved back into his 
parents' home where he remained until he entered the Navy some 
months later. On July 7, 1989, Billy's parents went to the 
state of Washington on vacation and to visit other children and 
Billy Rogers was left in charge of his parents' home while they 
were out of state. 
When Mr. and Mrs. Rogers left for Washinton state, they 
gave Billy Rogers clear, unequivocal instructions that, 1) no 
Ruling on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
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drinking was to occur in the home, and 2) Billy was not to allow 
any of his friends to stay in the home. Plaintiff overhead the 
instructions and agrees they were given. 
Billy Rogers and Shane had a party where both got drunk. 
Plaintiff and Billy Rogers left in Billy's car to take a friend 
home. After dropping off the friend, plaintiff occupied the 
front passenger side of the vehicle, Billy crashed his car into a 
tree causing plaintiff injuries. 
The basis of the plaintiff's claim against Harvey and 
Joanne Rogers is based on parental liability for failure to 
control their child Billy. The claim is that they had knowledge 
of the childs' habitual conduct manifested by evidence of prior 
acts which are same or similar to the act complained of. The 
Rogers', based on Billy's past conduct, could reasonably foresee 
that if they left town with Billy house sitting he would hold a 
party in which alcoholic beverages would be consumed. They had 
both the opportunity and the ability to control Billy's actions 
by either staying home, or making other arrangements for the 
care of their home. Accordingly the Rogers', by virtue of their 
special relationship with Billy, would be liable for their own 
negligence. 
Plaintiff relies heavily on the case of Morella v. 
Machu. That case considered whether parents who leave teenage 
children under poorly supervised circumstances where drinking 
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parties were liable to occur in their absence may be liable for 
damages caused by an intoxicated under aged party goer who 
injures innocent victims while driving away from the party. 
That case found liability and concluded that parents have a 
legal duty to see that their children are properly supervised in 
their absence. 
The problem is that the Morella case and the other cases 
relied upon by plaintiff are on the subject of parental 
liability for failure to control minors. Under Utah law a 
person is no longer a minor when he obtains the age of 
eighteen. Cases relied upon by plaintiff do not state that a 
parent has a duty to reasonably control an adult child. As an 
adult he is responsible for his own behavior. This would fall 
more under the Beach case cited by both parties as footnote 5 
states neither attendance of college nor agreement to submit to 
certain behavior standards make the student less and autonomous 
adult or the institution more a caretaker. The fact that the 
defendant's child Billy was left in care of their home and the 
party was at their home does not make Billy less an autonomous 
adult. 
I hold that the defendants' Harvey and Joanne Rogers, as 
a matter of law, did not have a duty to control their son Billy 
and they are not liable for his torts. Their leaving their 
adult son in charge of their home does not constitute actionable 
negligence. 
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Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted 
DATED this J day of May, 1992. 
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